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A model of limited participation in the asset market is developed, in which varieties of
consumption bundles are purchased sequentially. By this, heterogeneity in money holdings and in
the effective elasticity of substitution of consumers arises, which affects optimal markups chosen
by oligopolistic ﬁrms. The model generates a short-term inﬂation-output trade off, although all
ﬁrms can set their optimal price each period and no informational problems exist. The responses
are persistent even after a one-time monetary shock due to an internal propagation mechanism
that stems from the slow dissemination of newly injected money. Furthermore, a liquidity
effect, countercyclical markups, procyclical proﬁts and marginal costs after monetary shocks are
obtained. The model is simple and tractable, such that analytical results for the linearized model
can be derived.
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Monetary economics has seen a considerable variety of models labeled limited participation models
over the last two decades. Because of their common ability to replicate well some empirical features,
’[t]hese models represent a serious alternative to the sticky-price and sticky-wage Keynesian models
that have been popular in recent policy analysis.’, according to Williamson (2005). Originally,
Grossman and Weiss (1983) had an infrequent adjustment of asset holdings by households in mind,
combined with overlapping shopping sequences. In their model, consumers are assumed to make
staggered money withdrawals, i.e. at any given time only half the population is at the bank. The
notion that households do not adjust their assets each period is theoretically shown as optimal by
Jovanovic (1982) and empirically supported by Christiano et al. (1996), who ﬁnd that ’households do
not adjust their ﬁnancial assets and liabilities for several quarters after a monetary shock’. Households
in the Grossman-Weiss model need money balances to ﬁnance their consumption, since they face a
Cash-in-Advance constraint. A liquidity effect is obtained because falling interest rates are needed
after an increase in the money supply, to induce higher money holdings by the agents currently at
the bank. Furthermore, prices rise slowly after a positive monetary shock. However, the path of
adjustment is not satisfying. The price level and the interest rate are reaching the new steady state
in an oscillating manner. Because of the simpliﬁcation of setting output exogenously and constant,
no inﬂation-output trade off is modelled. Rotemberg (1984) uses the same timing structure, but
introduces production and capital. He ﬁnds that after a monetary expansion, output increases and
returns slowly to the steady state without oscillating. A Cobb-Douglas function for the combination
of utility from both period’s consumption is assumed. Therefore, households spend equal amounts of
their cash holdings each period in between their visits to the asset market, such that one important
aspect of intertemporal optimization of the households is not addressed. Also, because of perfect
competition, the optimal markup is not considered.
The present paper tries to shed some light on these and other questions by using a model with
oligopolistic competition in the goods market with arbitrary values for the elasticities of substitution
between varieties and periods.1 Analytical results are derived, which are not available for the
Grossman-Weiss and Rotemberg models. In these models, the distribution of wealth over time is
1Note that oligopolistic competition here does not necessarily stem from few ﬁrms populating the economy, but from
the fact that each consumer buys at a countable number of shops.
1difﬁcult to track because of the heterogenous agents. Hence, the models are limited to study the
effects of one-time monetary shocks in a deterministic setting. Maintaining the heterogenous money
holdings and the sequential shopping sequence of the models mentioned, I assume an ownership
structure of the shops that mimics the slow dissemination of newly injected money throughout the
economy, and leads to a model that can be analyzed with the standard tools for dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium models.
A different and widely used solution to the problem of tractability was found by Lucas (1990),
who lets household members pool their trade receipts at the end of the period. By this, a degenerate
money distribution, and therefore tractability is reached. However, the paper and many follow-ups
deal mainly with the liquidity effect and asset pricing implications, not with the inﬂation-output
trade off. Because households undo the effects of monetary policy at the end of each period, only
unanticipated monetary shocks have real effects, and last merely one period. Based on classical
search models of money such as Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), papers like Shi (1997) use Lucas’s
solution to study the effects of monetary policy in this environment. Search models discard the
Walrasian auctioneer and decentralize trading activities. Typically, potential buyers and sellers meet
with a certain probability and engage in trade if their wants coincide. In an alternative to Lucas’s
method, Lagos and Wright (2005) assume a periodic access for all agents to a centralized market in
a search model, where they choose the same money balances because of a restriction on the utility
function. While these solutions overcome the non-tractability and therefore the unsuitability of
studying monetary policy, a non-degenerate wealth distribution is also likely to have considerable
effects and would therefore be interesting to study.
Thus, some new models re-introduce the heterogenous money holdings into different settings.
Like Lagos and Wright, Williamson (2006) assumes a search and a centralized location. A random,
periodic re-allocation of agents between both allows for a slow spreading of new central bank money,
which can only be injected at the centralized location. Closed form solutions for the stochastic
version can be derived in the case of no monetary interventions. Monetary shocks, anticipated or not,
lead to distributional and persistent effects. The model of the present paper also features heterogenous
money holdings, but goes back to the original setup of the Grossman-Weiss and Rotemberg models.
As in their models, staggered money withdrawals are placed in a Walrasian environment. Shopping
2bundles of consumption goods takes time, in contrast to an implicit assumption taken in standard
models of monopolistic competition. In the present model, consumers buy each variety of their
bundles one after the other. If unexpected events occur during this sequence, the original plan is
altered according to the new circumstances. Since it is unlikely that all consumers start and ﬁnish
their sequences at the same points in time, these sequences overlap.
In the following section I will brieﬂy discuss a benchmark model of oligopolistic competition
with two households populating the economy. As is usual in these standard models, no real effects of
monetary interventions will arise. The following assumption has to be made: New money injected
into the system by the central bank reaches all agents in an identical way. Heterogenous shocks to
money holdings cannot be studied with this model because these shocks would lead to explosive
behavior or a violation of the Euler equation. Since all agents are informed about the monetary shock,
prices will immediately rise by the same percentage as the money stock.
In section 3, homogeneity is replaced by limited participation. One period is divided into two;
in each of these new periods both consumers are shopping, but only one of them is visiting the asset
market. Hence, monetary injections reaches only this consumer. It seems realistic to assume that not
all agents are beneﬁting from central bank actions in the same way, or as Williamson (2005) puts it:
’For example, when the Fed conducts an open market operation, the economic agents on the receiving
end of this transaction typically are large ﬁnancial institutions that are not directly connected to all
other economics agents in the economy through exchange. (...) This difference will be important
for short-run movements in interest rates, aggregate output, and the distribution of wealth across the
population.’ Additionally, the assumption that each shop belongs to one consumer together with a
sequential opening of these shops, leads to a slow spreading of the newly injected money and keeps
the model tractable. Because monetary injections take time to be distributed equally through second-
round effects, unequal wealth levels arise which in turn affect the aggregate price elasticity ﬁrms
are facing. The reason is the following: If consumers in the beginning of their shopping sequences
have a larger weight due to monetary transfers to them via the asset market, aggregate elasticity is
higher since these consumers spread the new income over the goods to follow in the sequence. This
introduces strategic interaction in the price-setting behavior of ﬁrms and thereby lowers the optimal
markup chosen. Hence, a short-term inﬂation-output trade off is reached. For monetary shocks, the
3model predicts therefore countercyclical markups, as empirically found by Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999). Speciﬁcally, markups are countercyclical at the ﬁrm level, coinciding with evidence in the
supermarket industry presented by Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996). These authors also conﬁrm that
prices are strategic complements. The Phillips Curve derived in section 4 displays inﬂation inertia
via the internal propagation mechanism, i.e. even one-time shocks lead to long lasting responses. The
impulse response functions developed in section 5 are empirically plausible. Output and proﬁts rise,
marginal costs (which correspond to wages) do so moderately while the interest rate falls (i.e. there is
a liquidity effect) after a positive monetary shock; features that were found empirically by Christiano
et al. (1997). In section 6, the general formulae for any given number of agents are developed. This
number can also be seen as the free parameter describing the lags in the monetary system suggested
in the last paragraph of Lucas (1990). Section 7 concludes.
2 A Standard Two-Consumer Model
Iwill developa two-consumer, two-ﬁrmmodelof oligopolistic competition as a reference model in or-
der to make clear which assumptions in section 3 drive the results. This model is built on the standard
monopolistic-competition Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model, with two agents instead of a representative
household, and two ﬁrms instead of a continuum. The stocks of each ﬁrm are owned by one of the two
consumers, such that the households earn the proﬁts of ’their’ ﬁrm. Furthermore, consumers have to
obey a Cash-in-Advance (CIA) constraint. Note that the oligopolistic structure stems mainly from the
assumption that each consumer buys at two different ﬁrms, which does not have to translate literally
into two ﬁrms populating the economy.
2.1 Setup
Households Each consumer maximizes the following standard utility function. The subscript i =





































t is the current price of the good of ﬁrm j. Visible from the intertemporal budget constraint,
households can acquire the cash needed for consumption in the same period (asset market opens ﬁrst,
Mi;t is beginning of period cash)
Mi;t + Bi;t = (1 + it¡1)Bi;t¡1 + ¦i
t¡1 + St; (2)
where ¦i




t of a ﬁrm, whose stocks are owned by household i. Here and
in what follows, I assume that consumers do not take into account their ownership of a ﬁrm while
shopping at that particular ﬁrm. Bi;t are bonds bought by household i, which cost one unit of the
currency and earn the interest rate it between time t and t + 1. St are this period’s nominal transfers,
which are the same for each household. The equation implies that at the beginning of each period,
households have to decide how to divide available resources between money holdings needed for
shopping and savings, i.e. bonds. Money cannot be transferred as cash between periods.2 Current
income from business activity cannot be used for current consumption while the cash injections can
be used contemporaneously, as in Lucas (1982).3 As normal, the central bank can either set the
money supply via St or the nominal interest rate it, where the respective other variable has to adjust
accordingly.






i;t Bi;t¡1 ¸ 0; (3)
where C
¡¾
i;t is the marginal utility of period t consumption and Bi;t¡1 are bond holdings at the begin-
ning of the period.
2See section 3 for a longer discussion of this point. Here it is clearly not optimal to carry over in the case of positive
nominal interest rates.
3In order to avoid the inﬂation-tax effects normally present in CIA models, the ﬁrms are ’de-personalized’, i.e. their
costs do not depend on the CIA constraint of the owner. Hence, no real effects of this restriction arises. See also footnote 4.
5Producers The two producers maximize the following utility function (the focus of the model is on

















t is the labor used to produce output Y
j
t (labor enters as a pure utility cost), P
jC
t is the price
with which real costs are converted into nominal costs and ½ measures the disutility of working. In
order to stay close to the standard models and avoid distortions due to the CIA constraint, this will be


















Optimizing the above stated problems leads to a set of ﬁrst-order conditions for households and ﬁrms.
Households Division of demand between the two consumption goods is governed, as usual, by the
elasticity of substitution ° and the relative price. Since there are only two ﬁrms in the economy, the
demand function is written in a slightly non-standard form. I use the explicit demand schedule facing
a producer who takes her inﬂuence on the price level into account, because both producers play a
Cournot game. The different schedule comes about from the fact that purchases of one good reduce
consumers’ remaining resources. This income effect vanishes in a model with an continuum of ﬁrms,


















4Alternative speciﬁcations do not change the qualitative results, but do complicate the analysis. Forward looking costs
would distort the pricing decision in the presence of expected inﬂation and would therefore give rise to real effects. While
this could be undone by introducing a subsidy, this would make it difﬁcult to see where the differences between this and the
next section arise.
6and vice versa for good b.5 The intertemporal consumption path is characterized by a normal Euler










The budget constraint (2), the transversality condition (3) and the CIA constraint (1) complete the
description of household’s optimal behavior.



















which is valid symmetrically for producer b. The optimal price setting for ﬁrm a and the real marginal
costs MCa































Because in this section households are identical, including the amount of transfers received from the
government, there will be no borrowing nor lending between them in equilibrium. Combined with the
fact that in this closed economy without investment net savings, i.e. bonds, have to be zero, private
bond holding of each agent are zero, too. Hence, equation (6) merely determines the interest rate.













In this case one has to make sure to account for the effect of P
j
t on P t in ﬁrms’ optimization processes.















which by the symmetry assumption of Pt = P
j




with MU being the constant markup
°+1
°¡1.











From this equation it is obvious that output depends only on technology and deep parameters.
Combined with the Euler equation (6), it becomes clear that the real interest rate stays constant after a
change in the nominal interest rate, i.e. ¯(1+it) =
Pt+1
Pt . Inﬂation jumps once, and is zero thereafter.
Thus, the model exhibits neutrality and superneutrality with respect to monetary policy. As was
already visible from equation (9), optimal (and realized) markups stay constant, a feature that has
been empirically rejected.7
2.4 Heterogeneity
One can argue that monetary policy is unlikely to affect all people in the economy in the same way and
at the same time. For example, businesses taking credits for large investment projects are beneﬁting
more from a decrease in interest rates than people who are taking small credits or are even savers.
Hence, it would be interesting to explore the effects of policy actions on different groups of agents,
or as Williamson (2005) writes: ’Indeed, these distributional effects may be very important for how
6Note that if the ﬁrms were not to take their inﬂuence on the general price level into account, the optimal markup would
be
°
°¡1, which would not change the conclusions drawn in this section.
7Again, see Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) for a longer discussion of this point.
8monetary policy works, if not the reason we should care about monetary policy.’ The model in this
section is not suitable for analyzing the implications of assumptions of this type. The easiest way to
model heterogeneity would be to consider ’partial helicopter drops’, i.e. only one agent is receiving
additional money from the central bank.8 In order to let both agents fulﬁll the Euler equation (6), one
has to allow for inter-household borrowing and lending. However, a monetary gift to only one person
introduces a wealth effect that, as usual in this kind of heterogenous-agents (or countries) model,
would let individual bond holdings explode, even though they are in zero net supply. Since explosive
behavior should be ruled out, this model is not able to show the implications of heterogeneity in the
out-of-steady-state income distribution or money holdings. This and other questions can be addressed
with the model of the following section.
3 A Sequential-Purchases Two-Agent Model
In the above section, it is assumed that all actions are done simultaneously, although in discrete-time
models one period is assumed to be of considerable length. Agents aggregate the consumption
goods they buy during one period and choose their consumption paths by relating these bundles
across periods. It is crucial that it takes virtually no time to acquire these goods. This implies on
the one hand that while deciding on the money spent on each good, all prices of the goods in the
consumption bundle are known. On the other hand, all households receive their income and identical
transfers at the same moment in time, implying that they can calculate equilibrium good prices while
buying bonds. As a result of all this, any changes in income (including monetary shocks) lead to an
instantaneous adjustment of prices, and therefore no real effects can be observed.
Only with the assumption of instantaneous purchases it can be justiﬁed that periods for all agents
start and end at the same time. If one is to assume that it takes some time to acquire a consumption
bundle, it is unlikely that consumers start and stop their shopping sequences at the same dates. To ac-
count for this point, I am dividing one period into two and introduce overlapping shopping sequences.
Instead of visiting both shops simultaneously, the two consumers now buy at one shop in the ﬁrst pe-
riod and at the other in the second period. Both goods still enter the same consumption bundle. Each
shop is serving two customers, who are in different stages of their shopping sequence. Seen from the
8Varying the interest rate could only have an effect if both agents face different interest rates. I chose to discuss the more
intuitive alternative, which leads to the same conclusions.
9ﬁrm’s perspective, this is equivalent to an economy with a representative consumer, but uncertainty
about the current stage of the shopping sequence of this consumer. Consumers start their shopping
sequences after having received their income and having adjusted their ﬁnancial positions. Hence, I
assume that one consumer receives income from business activity, bonds and transfers in, say, even
periods, while the other receives income in odd periods. This aspect of the model is close to Grossman
and Weiss (1983) and Rotemberg (1984). The assumption that consumers do not adjust their assets
instantaneously is empirically supported by Christiano et al. (1996). Graphic 1 shall help explain the
difference. In the upper half, people buy at both shops during one period, i.e. simultaneously. It does
not matter in which order they shop or who starts ﬁrst. One could imagine that the shops open one
after the other, but since all actions in the period are compressed to one single point in time, this does
not play any role. In the lower half, shopping sequences overlap. Now it matters when which shop
opens and who is buying there. Therefore, the length of the periods is cut in half with only one shop
being open in each ’new’ period. The arrows show the dates when the agents visit the bank and there-
fore between which points in time they can save by buying bonds. The limitation to a ﬁnite number
of shops introduces strategic complementarity between the prices of the ﬁrms. Empirical evidence for
this complementarity was found by Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) in the sector of supermarkets.
t t+1












Shop open: a b a b a
Figure 1: Difference in timing
103.1 Notation
Since now there is only one shop open each period, the time index is enough to distinguish between
the two ﬁrms. The ﬁrm which is open in t hands its proﬁts over to its owner, the consumer who
starts shopping in time t + 1. Furthermore, I will use the subscripts i = 1;2 to indicate consumers
in the following way: 1 denotes the consumer that is at the beginning of its shopping sequence, while
consumer 2 is at the end of this sequence. Hence, a person with the subscript 1 in t will have the
subscript 2 in t+1 and again 1 in t+2. Decisions on bonds and the division of money spent on both
goods are made at the beginning of the sequence, hence by the person with the index 1.
3.2 Setup












where the consumption bundle C1 is acquired over the course of two periods, such that the counter
increases in steps of two. This consumption aggregate C1 is deﬁned as in section 2, but since the
consumer buys sequentially, she does not know the price of the good to be purchased in the next














: ° > 1 (10)
The Cash-in-Advance constraint in the new notation is
M1;t ¸ PtC1;t + Pt+1C2;t+1 ´ CtPt; (11)
while the budget constraint also remains mostly unchanged
M1;t + Bt = (1 + it¡2)Bt¡2 + ¦t¡1 + St (12)
where ¦t¡1 is the revenue of the ﬁrm, whose stocks are owned by the household with index 1 in t.
Since the asset market is visited only every second period, interest is earned on bonds bought two






t Bt¡1 ¸ 0: (13)
Producers At the producer side, nothing changed. The two producers maximize the same utility
function








t is again the price that converts real to nominal costs, since labor enters only as utility costs. This
will later be set to Pt, such that comparisons can easily be made with section 2.9 Technology is also
the same as in section 2: Yt = AtNt.
3.3 First-Order Conditions
Due to the different timing assumptions, some differences in the ﬁrst order conditions arise. Notably,
since shopping is now sequential, households plan their purchases at each store based on expected
future relative prices of competitors. Due to this different consumption behavior, price setting of ﬁrms
is also affected.
Households At time t, the household which is at the beginning of its shopping sequence has to
decide how much cash to hold for this sequence, and how much to put into her account, resulting in an
Euler equation. This equation is quite standard, except that it is more convenient that the household
directly maximizes over cash holdings, a certain variable, in contrast to consumption that is uncertain

















´ ¯(1 + it); (14)
where it is the going interest rate, which is earned on bonds between t and t + 2. In deriving this





9The model focuses mainly on the optimal markup. If nominal marginal costs were to be described in a more detailed
way via a labor market, this assumption would stem from the labor market frictions that Christiano et al. (1997) found
necessary to limit the initial impact of monetary shocks on nominal marginal costs.
12This equation holds with equality if no cash is carried over from period t+1 to t+2, i.e. resources are
transferred to period t+2 only via the interest bearing bonds. In the appendix, this is proven to be an
optimal behavior for increases in the money supply that increase prices.10 However, it turns out that
this equality does not have to be the case for price decreases, which gives rise to an interesting possible
extension of the model. The model as described from here on is mainly valid for increases in the
money supply, whereas decreases would trigger an asymmetric, different response. This asymmetry
is in line with conventional wisdom about different dynamics during times of inﬂations and deﬂations.
After unexpected price decreases, consumers are delaying purchases, i.e. they carry cash over between
periods. Extending the model also for this option could prove a fruitful exercise that highlights the
asymmetric effects of monetary policy.
Turning back to the setup of the model, in order for the deﬁnition PtC1;t + Pt+1C2;t+1 ´ CtPt
in equation (11) to hold, the price index Pt has to be deﬁned in a more complicated manner. This
is the case because it involves Pt+1, which is unknown at the time of the decision on how much to
consume in period t. Hence, to make the price index consistent with the optimal consumption chosen


































Having decided how much cash M1;t to hold at the beginning of period t for shopping in t and
t + 1, the consumer now has to decide how to divide the cash between the two goods. As argued
above, the CIA constraint will be binding in the analyzed cases. Hence, the household will spend all





Knowing this, one can also solve for the consumption of the good in period t by maximizing the
expected value of the consumption bundle (10), resulting in a kind of second Euler equation




10Also Rotemberg (1984) argues that acting in such a way is optimal as long as a positive interest rate prevails, which is
also the case here.
11See Green (1964), chapter 3, on a more general discussion on the requirements of a price index.













Again, the budget constraint (12) and the transversality condition (13) complete the description of
households’ optimal behavior.
Producers Since shopping periods overlap, i.e. at each point of time one consumer is at the begin-
ning of her sequence (equation 18), and another one at the end (equation 17), total demand facing a
producer at time t is







Note, that people at the beginning of their shopping sequence have a higher elasticity of substitution
than the people further down the sequence (the consumer in the last period of the sequence just spends
all her money). Hence, when setting its price, the ﬁrm faces a trade off between extracting more proﬁts
from the costumers with a low elasticity, and loosing proﬁts from the customers at the beginning of
the sequence, who might substitute to ﬁrms that come later in the row. The optimal price is implicitly
given by
M2;t










which corresponds the standard formula Markup=1/Marginal Costs. Steady-state markup is MU =
(° + 3)=(° ¡ 1). Note that the ﬁrm is taking household expectations Rt as given, such that the game
played between the producers does not change compared to section 2. Instead of turning into a Stack-
elberg leader, the individual ﬁrm does not assume that its price setting affects people’s expectations
of future prices, hence the shops still play a Cournot game.
3.4 Equilibrium
Equilibrium requires market clearing in each period
Yt = C1;t + C2;t: (21)
In contrast to section 2, money holdings across agents are not identical anymore, which is crucial
for the results. Like Grossman and Weiss (1983) and Rotemberg (1984), I make the simplifying
14assumption that inter-household borrowing and lending is not possible. Although this would inﬂuence
money holdings and therefore probably also the results, it would contradict the structure of the model,
in which consumers are not going to the bank during their shopping sequence. Hence, consumers
currently at the bank do not engage in borrowing and lending with the consumers not at the bank.
Together with the fact that aggregate savings in a closed economy without investment have to be
zero, this leads to the same result as in section 2, namely that the interest rate adjusts in such a
way that buying bonds is not optimal for households. In this respect, the Euler equation (14) again
only determines the interest rate. Due to these restrictions, it is possible to ﬁnd a reduced form
representation of the linearized system in the next section.
4 Linearized System
An advantage of this model is the possibility of ﬁnding an analytical solution. In a ﬁrst step, money
holdings are substituted out to ﬁnd two equations summarizing the dynamics, plus one to determine
the equilibrium interest rate. A monetary policy rule and a process for technology complete the
description. Below, theseequationswillbederivedforthemodeloftwo(kindsof)agents, aspresented
in the preceding section. An analytical solution, i.e. expressions for the variables as functions of the
states, the exogenous variables and the shocks, is derived in section 4.1 and simulated in section 5.
The formulae for any given number of agents is then given in section 6.
Equation 1: Effects of Monetary Policy An equation for the effects of monetary policy can be
found by combining the log-linearized versions of equations (12), (15), (17), (18), (20), and (21),




½^ yt + ¢yt = st; (22)
where yt and ^ yt are expressed in percentage deviations from their steady-state values, ¼t is current
inﬂation and st is St
MSt:St:
1
.13 ^ yt is the output gap, deﬁned here as actual output minus the level of
output that would prevail in an economy with equal money holdings, given by
½+1
½ at. Since ﬁrms can
adjust prices at every period, the ﬂex-price equilibrium is always reached. This implies, contrary to
12Alternatively, one could also develop a formula describing the process of updating expectations:





13The steady-state employed here is a stationary economy with no trending variables.
15the standard Calvo-model, that the markup mut is the inverse of marginal costs, i.e. the negative of
marginal costs in the linearized form, in each period. Due to this fact marginal costs are
mct = ½yt ¡ (½ + 1)at = ½^ yt = ¡mut: (23)
Note that marginal costs here are costs for labor only, since capital is missing. Furthermore, proﬁts
are YtMUt, linearized yt +mut. It is visible from equation (22) that monetary injections are likely to
raise nominal GDP, where the size of the effect depends on yt¡1, and the division between inﬂation
and real output depends on current and past expectations, see next equation.
Equation 2: Phillips Curve In order to derive the Phillips Curve, the same mentioned equations




½^ yt ¡ ¢yt +
° ¡ 1
2
[Et(¼t+1) ¡ Et¡1(¼t)]: (24)
While the output gap is standard in Phillips-Curves of different models, the negative impact of
GDP-growth on inﬂation is not. For a discussion of the Phillips Curve, see section 4.1.
Equation 3: Interest Rate In order to determine the interest rate one can log-linearize equation








+¾¼t + ¾[Et(¢yt+1) + ¢yt] + ¾[Et(¢st+2 + ¢st+1)];
with rt being the percentage deviation of the interest rate from its steady-state¹ i = 1=¯ ¡ 1.14
Equation 4: Exogenous Variables To close the model, a monetary policy rule and a process for
technology have to be assumed. Since I mainly want to present the internal propagation mechanism, I
keep these equations as simple as possible; namely AR(1) processes with coefﬁcients 0 < ´s;´a < 1,
the monetary policy shock " and the shock to technology À:
14Although the percentage deviation of a variable measured in percentage points is a bit awkward, by this we do not have
to choose a value for ¯.
16st = ´sst¡1 + "t
at = ´aat¡1 + Àt: (25)
4.1 Solution
Once reduced to the two equations describing the dynamics of the model, (22) and (24), the endoge-
nous variables ¼t and yt can be expressed as functions of the states and shocks only. However, since
the intrinsic state variables M1 and M2 were substituted out because they are not directly observable,
other variables have to fulﬁll the role of state variables. It turns out that yesterdays values of out-
put yt¡1 and the exogenous variables st¡1, at¡1 summarize all necessary information. The former
is needed because M1 depends on last periods revenue, while the latter variables are important for
building expectations, required to determine M2. Hence, the following guess can be postulated:
yt = ¸yyyt¡1 + ¸ysst¡1 + ¸yaat¡1 + ¸y""t + ¸yÀÀt
¼t = ¸¼yyt¡1 + ¸¼sst¡1 + ¸¼aat¡1 + ¸¼""t + ¸¼ÀÀt; (26)
where expectations of future shocks are set to zero, according to the assumption of AR(1) processes
for the exogenous variables. This dynamic system is veriﬁed and solved by using the method of
undetermined coefﬁcients. The stability of the system is governed by the value for ¸yy, for which a
quadratic equation is obtained. For ° > 1 and ½ > 0 - as assumed in section 3 - both solutions to
this equation are positive, with one solution being greater and the other lesser than one. The ﬁrst root
is therefore discarded, and the solution to the equation using the second root is given below together
with the coefﬁcients for the effects of past output and monetary policy.
¸yy =
(° + 3)2½ + 8(° ¡ 1) ¡
p
(° + 3)½[(° + 3)3½ ¡ 64(° ¡ 1)]
2[(° + 3)½ + 4](° ¡ 1)
> 0;< 1
¸¼y =
4 + ¸yy[(° + 3)½ ¡ 4]
4 + 2(° ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ¸yy)
> 0
¸¼s = 2´s
2(° ¡ 1)¸¼y + (° + 3)½ ¡ 4








(° + 3)½ + 4
> 0
¸¼" =
4(° ¡ 1)¸¼y + (° ¡ 1)¸¼s[(° + 3)½ + 4] + 2[(° + 3)½ ¡ 4]
4(° ¡ 1)¸¼y + 4(° + 3)½
:
The effects of technology can be seen from the following coefﬁcients
¸¼a = ´a
(° + 3)(½ + 1)[(° ¡ 1)¸¼y ¡ 4]
(° ¡ 1)f[(° + 3)½ + 4](1 ¡ ´a) + 4¸¼yg + 4(° + 3)½
¸¼À =
(° ¡ 1)[(° + 3)½(¸¼a ¡ ¸¼y) + 4¸¼a ¡ (° + 3)¸¼y] ¡ (° + 3)(1 + ½)[(° + 3)½ ¡ 4]
(°2 ¡ 9)½ + 4(° + 1) ¡ 2(° ¡ 1)2¸¼y
¸ya =
(° + 3)(½ + 1)´a ¡ 4¸¼a
(° + 3)½ + 4
¸yÀ =
(° + 3)(½ + 1) ¡ 4¸¼À
(° + 3)½ + 4
:
Note that the effects ¸ys;¸ya;¸¼s;¸¼a of yesterdays exogenous variables at¡1 and st¡1 disappear if
their AR(1) processes are reduced to white noise, i.e. ´a = ´s = 0. It can also be seen from ¸y" > 0
that expansionary monetary shocks unambiguously have a positive effect on current output, while
¸¼y > 0 shows that past economic activity has a positive effect on inﬂation. Furthermore, positive
monetary shocks have a stimulating effect on output also in the following period, see ¸ys > 0. The
sign of the effect of monetary shocks on current inﬂation, ¸¼", depends on ½ and °. To evaluate the
dynamics of the Phillips Curve (24) of this model, I compare the implications of the curve and the
solution of the model in this section with the critique of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve in Mankiw
(2001). He names three ’failures of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve’: the inability to generate
inﬂation persistence, the possibility to generate disinﬂationary booms and the impulse-response
functions after monetary shocks.
The New Keynesian Phillips Curve has problems in generating the empirically observed inﬂation
persistence. In the present model, the state variable yt¡1 can be replaced by ¼t¡1 by reformulating
the dynamic system (26). Having done so, it is evident that the effect of past inﬂation on current
inﬂation is equal to ¸yy. This coefﬁcient is smaller than one but larger than zero, such that inﬂation
persistence also exists with the internal propagation mechanism only, no autocorrelated shocks or
similar dynamics have to be assumed. One should keep in mind that this is a stylized model, which
18lacks any other mechanisms often employed for slow adjustment of real and nominal variables.
However, the model suffers from another criticism of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve in Mankiw
(2001), namely inﬂationary recessions.15 If the central bank announces inﬂationary measures, today’s
output falls for common values of ½ and °.16 Higher values of ½ lower the effects of inﬂation on
output, while a low ° decreases the effects of expected inﬂation on current inﬂation. Both effects
minimize inﬂationary recessions after announcements of inﬂationary measures. However, one should
consider that the effects of announced monetary policy in this model stems from a change in behavior
of the households due to the announcement, namely a different decision on cash balances. This
change in behavior is likely to be small in low-inﬂation environments, where most consumers do not
actively follow the announcements of the central bank. Furthermore, for large announcements, it is
probable that households increase the frequency of visits to the asset market, such that announced
measures could end up not having any real effect.
Finally, concerning the response of output, inﬂation, marginal costs, markup and the interest rate
to shocks, I refer to section 5, where impulse response functions for the model in this paper are
plotted. While the responses of the variables are generally consistent with the empirical ﬁndings, the
hardest point to fulﬁll is the slow and gradual effects of monetary shocks on inﬂation and output.
Autocorrelated monetary shocks, as often used in the literature, low values for ° or increasing the
number of agents generate hump-shaped impulse response functions.
15Since the model in this paper deals mainly with inﬂationary episodes, I focus on the equivalence of disinﬂationary
booms for announced inﬂations.
16Note that the expectations of future shocks in (26) were set to zero. Hence, they do not appear there, but in (24).
195 Simulation
In this section I calculate the impulse-response functions to further check the dynamic implications
of the model. In section 5.1 I will simulate the model for n = 2 agents, whereas the model with
three agents in section 5.2 allows for richer dynamics, i.e. agents react to shocks by adjusting their
expectations and re-optimizing their plans in the middle of their shopping sequence. The general
formulae for any given n are given in section 6.
5.1 Simulation for n=2
I use equations (22) to (25) to simulate the model with the parameter values ° = 16 (which implies
a steady-state markup of 26%)17, ½ = 0:1 (close to constant marginal costs) and ¾ = 3 (which
merely determines the size of the interest rate reaction).18 The steady-state markup and the value
for ¾ are not as controversial as the value for ½, for which values between zero and inﬁnity are used
in the literature. The value used here is rather low and implicitly implies a labor supply elasticity of
10%. Raising this value shortens the reactions by lowering the response of output while increasing the
effect on inﬂation. Whereas otherwise the responses do not change qualitatively, this result seems to
strengthen the point of Christiano et al. (1997) that labor market frictions (like predetermined wages
that would dampen the initial impact on inﬂation) are probably needed if the model is to be completed
with a labor market.19
In the left panel of ﬁgure 2, a one-time monetary injection of 1% to total money supply takes
place (which corresponds to s1 = 3=2, zero otherwise).20 The horizontal axis shows periods, whilst
the vertical axis depicts percentage deviations from the steady-state. Note that the interest rate got
scaled down by the factor 10 to ﬁt in the same picture; a 0.1 percent shift in the graph corresponds
to a movement of one percent. In the right panel an autocorrelation of ´s = 0:3 in the monetary
policy rule (25) with "1 = 3=2 is assumed. In the left panel of ﬁgure 3, the one-percent shock takes
place twice, i.e. both agents receive the same positive monetary injection (s1 = s2 = 3=4, zero
otherwise).21 It is noteworthy, that even for one-time monetary injections, the internal propagation
17Steady-state markup is
°+3
°¡1. Because of the oligopoly, the markup is generally relatively high for given values of °.
18The function was calculated using the Matlab codes of Uhlig (1997).
19With a labor elasticity of 1 (½ = 1), an initial effect on output around 0.18% is reached after the same shock. Lower
values of ° increase this value.
20s is the percentage shock to MR1. For a 1% shock to total money supply MR1 + MR2, s has to be adjusted
accordingly.
21To stay with the picture of two agents with alternating trips to the bank, this would imply that both agents receive the
same amount of money at the same time, but one agent ’picks up’ the money one period later. The second shock is therefore
anticipated one period ahead, which indirectly leads to the initial rise in the interest rate.
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Figure 2: n=2. On the left no autocorrelated monetary policy rule, on the right ´s = 0:3
mechanism already prolongs the responses. The model displays a liquidity effect, except on impact
for the two subsequent shocks and very high autocorrelations of the monetary injections. Hump-
shaped responses are obtained for autocorrelated monetary shocks and n = 3. Low values for °
lower the initial response of inﬂation, such that no initial reaction with a subsequent hump-shaped
response can be reached for ° = 7, see the right panel of ﬁgure 3. Output would in this case rise
initially to 1.2% because of strong substitution effects. However, in this case the steady-state markup
is unrealistically high at 66%. Generally, the impulse-response functions are in line with qualitative
empirical facts. The markup falls and moves countercyclical, both features are empirical observations
which are difﬁcult to reproduce in the standard new Keynesian framework. Real marginal costs in the
linearized form are given by mct = ¡mut (mu being the markup). Hence, they increase mildly after
a positive monetary shock. Because of the lack of capital, procyclical marginal costs would equal
wages after the introduction of a labor market. Linearized proﬁts are yt + mut and procyclical as
well, since output rises more than the markup falls. Thus, the model coincides with the observations
of Christiano et al. (1997), who ﬁnd that after a positive monetary shock output and proﬁts rise, wages
increase mildly and the interest rate falls.
5.2 Simulation for n=3
The linearized ﬁrst-order equations for the case of n = 3 agents are developed from the general
formulae from section 6, with the optimal consumption for each agent already inserted. They are
given as
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Figure 3: n=2. On the left two subsequent shocks; on the right ° = 7, one shock
Households
Euler Equation (¾ ¡ 1)Etfpt+3 ¡ ptg = ¾(Etfmr1;t+3g ¡ mr1;t) ¡ rt
with Price Index pt = pt + pt+1 + pt+2
Money Holdings mr1;t = pt¡1 + yt¡1 + st
mr2;t = mr1;t¡1 ¡
°¡1
6 Et¡1f¼t+1 + 2¼tg
mr3;t = mr2;t¡1 ¡
°¡1
2 Et¡1f¼tg Pricing
30mr1;t + 12mr2;t ¡ 42mr3;t ¡ 7(7° + 11)mct = (° ¡ 1)Etf¼t+2 + 25¼t+1g
Market Clearing






















































Markup          
Output          
Interest Rate   
Inflation       
















































Markup          
Output          
Interest Rate   
Inflation       
Figure 4: n=3. On the left no autocorrelated monetary policy rule, on the right ´s = 0:3
22with marginal costs mc deﬁned as in (23). The transversality condition also has to be obeyed.
Steady-state markup is given by
°+11=7
°¡1 . The equations for the money holdings can be used to substi-




Etf25¼t+1 + 2¼t+2g + Et¡1f2¼t+1 ¡ 17¼tg ¡ 7Et¡2f¼t + 2¼t¡1g
i
= 30(¼t¡1 + ¢yt¡1 + ¢st) + 42(¼t¡2 + ¢yt¡2 + ¢st¡1) + 7mct (27)





Etf2¼t+2 + 3¼t+1g ¡ Et¡1f¼t+1 + 5¼tg ¡ Et¡2f¼t + 2¼t¡1g
i
(28)
As before, one could label the ﬁrst one ’Effects of monetary policy’ and the second ’Phillips
Curve’, but because of their complicated structure this is less obvious. For the simulation, I use
the following parameter values: Coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion as before ¾ = 3, elasticity of
substitution ° = 12, coefﬁcient of marginal disutility of labor again ½ = 0:1. As before, these values
have been chosen to match standard values (¾) or to be close to standard values for resulting variables
(thechosen° impliesasteady-statemarkupof23%). Theimpulseresponsefunctionforashockof1%
the total money supply (i.e. s1 = 2, zero otherwise) without any autocorrelated shock is depicted on
the left panel of ﬁgure 4, while in the right panel ´s = 0:3 and "1 = 2. As can be seen, increasing the
number of ﬁrms makes the responses longer lasting, but smaller in size. Output increases in a more
or less hump-shaped manner before returning over time to the steady-state values. For illustrative
purposes, an alternative value ° = 4:5 is chosen in ﬁgure 5. While this generates a very high steady
state markup of 73%, the inﬂation response is lower on impact. On the left, all three agents receive
the same 1% shock one after another. On the right, only one agents receives the monetary transfer.
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Figure 5: n=3, ° = 4:5. On the left three subsequent shocks; on the right one shock
236 General Case
InthissectionIexplorethegeneralcaseforanygivennumbernofagentsintheeconomy, whichcould
also be seen as the free parameter that determines the length of a whole period asked for in the last
paragraph of Lucas (1990). The structure of the model is maintained, in particular the overlapping
purchases and the assumptions about the timing of shop openings (at each point in time, one shop
opens).















Pt+iCi+1;t+i = C1;tPt; (29)
while the budget constraint also remains mostly unchanged
M1;t + Bt = (1 + it¡n)Bt¡n + ¦t¡1 + St: (30)
Again, the household receives last period’s proﬁts ¦t¡1 = Yt¡1Pt¡1 from ’his’ shop. Household i’s

























5; ° > 1 (31)
where the goods 1 to i¡1 already have been purchased and the consumption bundle consists of goods


























Solving this equation veriﬁes homothetic preferences:
Ci;t ´ ªi;tMi;t; (32)












































k;t+k¡i ´ 1: (36)
The law of motion for all money holdings, except for M1 determined in equation (30), is
Mi;t = Mi;t¡1 ¡ Ci;t¡1Pt¡1: (37)
Note that the index for each person is increased each period, since it denotes the time since she opened
her shop.
















are pure labor utility costs and PC
t is the price which converts real to nominal costs,








































which equals Markup = 1=MC. This equation can be used together with equations (29), (30),
(32)-(37), and a monetary policy rule to to simulate the economy or to derive a reduced form for the
linearized version, as done in section 5 for n = 3.
257 Conclusion
With the present setup of the model, several empirical observations can be replicated: 1) a short-term
inﬂation-output trade off after a monetary injection can be reached, although all ﬁrms can freely
chose their optimal prices each period 2) empirical plausible impulse-response functions for output
and inﬂation after monetary injections 3) a liquidity effect, and 4) a countercyclical markup at the ﬁrm
level after monetary shocks, which would also imply procyclical wages. The model generates a mi-
crofounded, internal propagation mechanism which does not rely on capital or sticky prices, but on the
slow spreading of newly inserted money. This can be seen as a way of describing the effects of central
bank actions in reality, where only parts of the population beneﬁt through ﬁrst-round effects, while
others are affected indirectly and later. The underlying friction of limited participation of consumers
is empirically supported by Christiano et al. (1996). A reduced form description of the linearized
system including a Phillips Curve can be obtained, without assuming a degenerate money distribution.
As stated, after monetary shocks optimal markup falls. Strategic complementarity is important in
this model. Each ﬁrm wants to maintain a higher markup, but would suffer too large a drop in sales if it
raised prices ﬁrst, because customers substitute away to other ﬁrms. As other ﬁrms slowly adjust their
prices, each ﬁrm can raise prices itself only gradually, thereby limiting coming pricing increases of
competitors and so on. This effect arises due to the sequential structure of the model. In discrete time
models with symmetry assumptions on ﬁrms, this process of reacting to other ﬁrms’ price adjustments
is done instantaneously. Price setters calculate their own optimal price knowing that all ﬁrms are alike.
Hence, other ﬁrms’ price increases are completely anticipated before setting their own price, and the
new steady state is reached instantaneously. This could be seen as an unrealistic feature, since most
ﬁrms react to other ﬁrms’ observed price setting behavior, and do not increase prices relying on the
belief that all other ﬁrms will make identical price increases at the same time. Only if all ﬁrms adjust
at the same time will costumers not have the possibility of substituting to a cheaper competitor, who
did not yet adjust. Hence, with the present model, deeper insights into collusion incentives, dynamic
oligopolies and the role of coordination devices could possibly be gained, which in turn can be used
to, e.g., study the mechanisms present during the introduction of the Euro.
26Appendix: Carrying over Cash between Periods
This appendix shows when it is optimal to not carry over cash in between periods. First note that it
could only be optimal to carry over resources in the form of cash if unforseen shocks happen after the
agent has visited the bond market, because with positive nominal interest rates it is clearly optimal to
carry over resources with interest-bearing bonds. Hence, the shock has to take place in t + 1. In the
following I will derive the optimality condition for the two-shop case, which also gives intuition for
the general case with n agents.









where purchases of period t were already done because of the above argument, i.e. the decision con-
sidered takes place in t + 1. M2;t+1 is the money used for purchases in t + 1. In order for carrying
cash over not to be optimal, the marginal utility of increasing these purchases has to be higher than
the expected marginal utility of increasing expenditure in the coming periods. Since
M1;t+2
Pt+2 = C1;t+2,













Considering the LHS of (39), it has to be taken into account that the decision to carry over money



























Inserting all this into formula (39) leads to the following condition for carrying cash over to the






















27As stated above, I consider only increases in the money supply at t + 1. C1;t > C2;t+1 since
C1;t includes additional to C2;t+1 also C1;t. Remember that the discrete-number-of-agents indexes
of section 3 are a sum, not an average. Hence, the LHS is larger than one. On the RHS, ¯ < 1 and
Pt+1 · Pt+2, since the prices increase monotonically after a positive monetary shock (even if prices
jumped immediately to the new steady state, this would be true). Furhtermore, the consumer does
not visit the asset market where he receives higher income until period t + 2, but prices start rising
already in t + 1. Therefore M1;t=Pt · M1;t+2=Pt+2, i.e. the consumption of the agent who did not
receive the monetary transfer ﬁrst drops and picks up over time. Hence, the RHS is less than one and
the condition is fulﬁlled.
While the necessary conditions are more complicated to derive for the general case with n shops,
it should be intuitive that it is not optimal to carry over cash from one period to the next if prices are
rising, as after a monetary expansion. Rather, it would be optimal to transfer money from coming
periods to today, which is ruled out by the Cash-in-Advance constraint.
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